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f
touching brains
Jason Tougaw
The first time I held Dum's brain in my hands, I was surprised 
first by its weight, and then by what I had suppressed—an 
awareness of the once-living man, a stocky seventy-year-old 
who had died of heart disease. When the man was alive, I 
thought, it was all there—internal pictures and words, memo-
ries of the dead and the living.
— Siri Hustvedt, The Sorrows of an American 
The weight of Dum's brain may be surprising, but it's simple to 
measure. An average human brain weighs about three pounds. In 
his influential book The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion 
in the Making of Consciousness, clinical neurologist and theoretical 
neuroscientist Antonio Damasio observes, "After considering how 
consciousness may be produced within the three pounds of flesh we 
call brain, we may revere life and respect human beings more, rather 
than less" (28). In other words, studying the brain to determine its 
role in "the making of consciousness" need not be a reductive enter-
prise. As a physical object, the brain resonates strangeness, mystery, 
and uknowability: its folds, crevices, and taut surface; its top-heavy 
shape, gray and white matter, and apparently identical hemispheres; 
its interior nuclei, glands, and the cerebrospinal fluid that surrounds 
its surface; its neurons with their axons and branching dendrites; the 
glial cells and myelin sheaths that insulate, support, and modulate 
those neurons; the chemicals secreted and consumed by the cells; 
the proteins and amino acids that influence the cells' behavior. The 
weight of a brain is probably the crudest measurement we have, 
and even that can vary by as much as a pound from one human to 
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the next (and the weight of a cadaver's brain depends on how it's 
preserved). Even the simplest questions about the brain compels the 
asker to think about its estranging anatomy.
In this essay, I focus on the portrayal of physical brains in three 
novels: Siri Hustvedt's The Sorrows of an American, Ian McEwan's 
Saturday, and John Wray's Lowboy. These novels are representative 
of a common literary phenomenon: the dramatization of a fantasy 
whereby touching brains may reveal the stuff of which self is made. 
In terms of genre, these novels are revisionist mysteries, wrapped 
in conventions of detective fiction but revising those conventions in 
fundamental ways. Their protagonists' affiliations with science and 
medicine enable their authors to link the mysteries of plot to mysteries 
about brains. Hustvedt's protagonist, Erik Davidsen, is a psychiatrist 
reluctantly embroiled in an anonymous extortionist's persecution of 
his sister, a mystery he can't solve without his eccentric friend Burton, 
a historian of memory science. McEwan's Henry Perowne is a neu-
rosurgeon hounded by a petty criminal whose Huntington's disease 
becomes a central plot device. Wray's Will Heller, alias Lowboy, is a 
schizophrenic teenager recently escaped from a psychiatric hospital 
and pursued through subway tunnels and city streets by a mystified 
Detective Lateef with the help of the boy's mother Violet, a failed 
student of neurochemistry.1 Representations of physical brains in 
Saturday are pervasive, while they are more scattered in Lowboy and 
Sorrows of an American. In all three cases, however, brains provoke 
questions about the relationship between physiology and the self that 
become central to narrative closure.
In each novel, plot resolution depends only partly on the solv-
ing of crimes. Ultimately, Hustvedt's Erik uncovers the identities of 
his sister's extortionists; with the help of his son, McEwan's Perowne 
fights off a violent intruder out for revenge after the smug, wealthy 
protagonist insults his pride during an argument about a fender 
bender; and Wray's Detective Lateef discovers that Violet is also 
schizophrenic, momentarily apprehending Will before the novel closes 
with its teenage protagonist falling onto subway tracks as a train 
approaches. These resolutions are necessary but insufficient to the 
closure of the novels—which dramatize impossible quests for interior-
ity. The process of solving crimes becomes a vehicle for characters to 
develop new understandings about the relationship between brain, 
body, self, and world. 
All three novels portray physical brains as vehicles for a fantasy 
that their characters might find elusive, intangible, or ethereal ele-
ments of self by dissecting brains, holding them, examining them, or 
just thinking about them. In these fictions, touching brains provokes 
a philosophical question their characters cannot answer: How does 
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the interplay of physiology and the material world produce the felt 
states whose sum we call self? Plot resolution requires philosophi-
cal reflection to become concrete, guiding protagonists' actions and 
relationships. In short, they must find ways to escape or transcend 
the insularity of their inner lives. In the process, the novelists ques-
tion—or revise—conventional understandings of interiority, suggesting 
that our shorthand term for the representation of what Damasio calls 
"the feeling of what happens" may obscure fundamental elements of 
the literary experiments it describes. 
When novelists portray fantasies of finding selves in brain matter, 
they are responding to arguments made by theoretical neuroscientists 
like Damasio, Gerald Edelman, Jaak Panksepp, and Mark Solms—all of 
whom take the liberty of stepping outside the laboratory to speculate 
or perhaps fantasize about relationships between biology, self, and 
culture. Damasio's theory of consciousness hinges on the dynamic 
relationship between organisms and objects, a relationship that pro-
duces the mental images that comprise subjective experience. One of 
Edelman's several books on his Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, 
or "neural Darwinism," is entitled A Universe of Consciousness: How 
Matter Becomes Imagination (a collaboration with Giulio Tononi). The 
first chapter of Panksepp's book Affective Neuroscience: The Founda-
tion of Human and Animal Emotions begins with the sentence, "Our 
emotional feelings reflect our ability to subjectively experience certain 
states of the nervous system" (9). In The Brain and the Inner World: 
An Introduction to the Neuroscience of Subjective Experience, Solms 
and Oliver Turnbull seek to build on "new insights into the natural laws 
that govern our inner life" in order to resolve longstanding conflicts 
between neuroscience and psychoanalysis (xiv). The authors of these 
books are frank about the gap between their dramatic hypotheses 
and the available evidence. Like the novelists, they are taking the 
liberty of speculating based on what we do know, in part to spark 
cultural dialogue and in part to suggest avenues for research that 
may provide some of the elusive answers. 
In the past two decades, a growing number of novelists (and 
memoirists) have turned their attention to the confounding gap 
between what we're learning about the physiology of the brain and 
the various forms of immaterial experience that emerge from it: 
consciousness, imagination, feeling, emotion, affect, memory, and 
self.2 An astounding number of these novels are revisionist myster-
ies of one kind or another. In his essay "Rise of the Neuronovel" (in 
which he coins the term neuronovel), Marco Roth makes it clear 
how widespread the phenomenon is, including works such as Mark 
Haddon's The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time (2003), 
narrated by an autistic child detective; Jonathan Lethem's Motherless 
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Brooklyn (1999), whose protagonist is an unwitting detective with 
Tourette's Syndrome; Rivka Galchen's Atmospheric Disturbances 
(2008), narrated by a psychiatrist suffering from paranoid delusions; 
Richard Powers's The Echo-Maker (2006), whose protagonist suffers 
from Capgras Syndrome, leading him to suspect that his friends 
and loved ones are imposters; and McEwan's earlier novel Enduring 
Love (1997), in which the villain's exotic condition results in a delu-
sion that the novel's protagonist loves him. In addition to the novels 
Roth examines, we might add Powers's Galatea 2.2 (1995); Lauren 
Slater's Lying (2000); David B.'s Epileptic (1996; 2005), in which the 
focus on the brain as physical object is fundamental to the blending 
of fiction and memoir; Teju Cole's Open City (2012), narrated by a 
psychiatric resident whose observations about urban life are filtered 
through his work with people suffering from mental illness; Haruki 
Murakami's IQ84 (2011), in which the heroine perfects an assassina-
tion technique involving a needle designed to invade a tiny spot in the 
brain where conscious life may be extinguished; and, finally, Thomas 
Harris's Hannibal (1999), made notorious through Ridley Scott's film 
adaptation of the scene in which Hannibal sautés the living brain of a 
Justice Department officer and feeds it to FBI agent Clarice Starling. 
Roth decries the "rise of the neuronovel" by way of comparison 
to the genre's predecessors: "What has variously been referred to as 
the novel of consciousness or the psychological novel or confessional 
novel—the novel, at any rate, about the workings of a mind—has 
transformed itself into the neurological novel, wherein the brain be-
comes the mind." Writers of neuronovels are heirs to a tradition of 
modernist and postmodernist luminaries whose famous experiments 
with representing consciousness defined much of the previous cen-
tury's literature—including Virginia Woolf, E. M. Forster, James Joyce, 
Gertrude Stein, Marcel Proust, Ralph Ellison, Christopher Isherwood, 
Vladimir Nabokov, and Toni Morrison.3 As Roth points out, psycho-
logical novels—Clarissa, Frankenstein, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde, Mrs. Dalloway, and Invisible Man, for instance—have 
never been only about the workings of the mind. The same is true 
of neuronovels. 
Roth uses the term neuronovel pejoratively, but it's an apt de-
scriptor for a thriving subgenre of literary fiction. As Stephan Besser 
argues in "Mixing Repertoires: Brain, Psyche, and Memory in Recent 
Neurological Fictions," the idea that neuroscience is a monolithic 
practice dominated by a reductionist and determinist materialism 
is a misleading generalization: a range of materialisms characterize 
theory and practice in neuroscience. While neuronovels engage ma-
terialist arguments about relations between brain and self, they do 
not represent a single point of view. A swift taxonomy of neuronovels 
demonstrates a range of literary techniques for representing the mind 
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and brain in social and environmental contexts. These techniques 
are often combined in a single novel, but one or another tends to 
dominate. While many of these novels focus on protagonists whose 
neurological difference is at the crux of the narrative, this is not their 
defining feature. Some neuronovels mine neurological syndromes 
for techniques of narration, designing sentence and story patterns 
as mimetic symptoms of the syndrome in question, as in Haddon's 
Curious Incident, Lethem's Motherless Brooklyn, or Slater's Lying. 
In others, neurologically different characters catalyze the transfor-
mation of neurotypical protagonists, as in McEwan's Enduring Love 
and Saturday. Others focus on the experience of caregivers or family 
members of people suffering from severe neurological disease, as in 
David B.'s Epileptic, Powers's The Echo Maker, and Wray's Lowboy. 
Another group involves protagonists whose medical professions or 
scientific research put them in contact with the minds and brains 
of others, including Hustvedt's Sorrows of An American, McEwan's 
Saturday, Cole's Open City, and Powers's Galatea 2.2. Still others 
use the brain as a theatrical plot device, as in Harris's Hannibal 
and Murakami's IQ84. Contrary to Roth's argument, the addition of 
brains need not require the exclusion of minds. If neuronovels share 
a common element, it's an interest in brain research for the sake of 
generating new ideas about how consciousness might be narrated 
and understood. In this sense, neuronovels are cultural responses 
to neuroscience, expanding the domain of critical debates about the 
brain. Because of this, it may be the case that neuronovels are more 
similar in their cultural contributions than their formal attributes. 
If modernist experiments with representing consciousness are 
the most significant literary influence on the neuronovel, the "brain 
memoir"—or autobiographical account of neurological difference, 
disease, injury, or experience—is the genre's closest living relative. 
While neuronovels differ from brain memoirs in many of their aims 
and forms, they are both responding to contemporary develop-
ments in brain research, and they share an impulse to use narrative 
to probe social and philosophical questions that emerge from this 
research—questions that are often too ambiguous, overdetermined, 
or subjective to be pursued through scientific methods. 
Of course, neuronovels come in many forms and they are 
shaped by the philosophical and political dispositions of their authors. 
Nonetheless, like brain memoirs and modernist fictions, they tend 
to share common aims, manifested in varying degrees in individual 
works. Neuronovels revisit the representation of consciousness in 
response to developments in brain research; provoke debates about 
determinism and reductionism, asking readers to reconsider simple 
cause-and-effect relationships between biology and experience; re-
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flect and challenge cultural assumptions about neurological difference; 
experiment with literary conventions to foreground the bewildering 
complexity of relations between brain, body, and world; and chal-
lenge the equation of consciousness and interiority, suggesting that 
conscious experience is dynamic and relational, emerging through in-
teractions between an organism (or protagonist) and its environment, 
including other organisms, cultural products, and social relationships. 
In the process they provoke a reexamination of the modernist fictions 
whose renown for experimenting with interiority has overshadowed 
the dynamic and relational portraits of consciousness they depict. 
This challenge to assumptions about interiority may be the neu-
ronovel's most easily overlooked cultural contribution, but it is also 
the element most entangled with the genre's other features. In fact, 
it may be the key to understanding the challenge many neuronovels 
pose to widespread cultural assumptions about the brain, assump-
tions that influence the direction of scientific research and medical 
practice. The term "interiority" became pervasive in literary studies 
after interior monologues and stream of consciousness became the 
primary focus of the big modernist experiments. Ulysses, Mrs. Dal-
loway, and The Sound and the Fury disrupted literary conventions in 
order to find formal means of representing what mental experience 
feels like.4 "Interiority" is so standard a term that we've forgotten it's 
a metaphor, one that conflates the fact that our brains reside inside 
our skulls with the idea that our mental experience must also live in 
a container. In its usage, the term both encompasses and obscures 
the inexorable interplay between body, mind, and environment central 
to the literary experiments it describes. While I'm not dismissing the 
term or advocating its disuse, I am taking a cue from the novels I've 
been discussing to suggest the time is right to defamiliarize it enough 
to expand its definition and implications. In neuronovels, interiority 
is recast with a range of narrative techniques for representing felt 
states produced through the dynamic interaction of an organism (or 
character) and environment. Interiority, they remind us, is not all 
about interiors. We can touch physical brains. We know where they 
are. But where is the self, or the mind, or consciousness? Inside 
what? Our bodies? Our skulls? Not exactly. 
In his book Embodied: Victorian Literature and the Senses, 
William A. Cohen uses the term "material interiority" to describe the 
"literary depiction of ethereal inner qualities in a language of tangible 
objects" in nineteenth-century fiction (476). Cohen's concept expands 
the purview of interiority, emphasizing its dynamic and relational 
qualities. The impulse is similar to that of neuronovels, which rep-
resent the brain as one component in a dynamic and elusive system 
through which consciousness and selfhood emerge. As Cohen ob-
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serves, a range of body parts (and other objects) become entangled 
with "ethereal inner qualities" in novels by Charles Dickens, Charlotte 
Brontë, Anthony Trollope, and Thomas Hardy. The novels reflect the 
wide-ranging objects of inquiry of their era's quickly evolving and 
increasingly public psychological sciences whose purview was more 
diffuse than twenty-first century brain research. Phrenology focused 
on the skull and face, physiognomy on physical traits and demeanor, 
vivisection on nerves and muscles, evolutionist psychology on the 
relationship between behavior and genetic inheritance, and sexol-
ogy on genital behavior.5 Of course, twenty-first-century science 
examines skulls, faces, nerves, muscles, genes, and genitals—but 
neuroscience, with its acute focus on the brain (and sometimes the 
nervous system as a whole) currently attracts more cultural attention 
and social influence than any other branch of psychology or human 
physiology. As responses to neuroscience, neuronovels tend to focus 
primarily on the brain—generally in literal terms, rather than through 
the metaphors of entombment, excrement, penetration, and pollution 
Cohen examines (Embodied 41). 
When Roth argues that neuronovels "capitulate" to neuroscience, 
he's partly right. The brain is central in these novels. According to 
Roth, the problem with neuronovels is that they mirror reductionist 
and determinist tendencies of neuroscience. Of course, neuroscience 
is a range of disciplines, and it would be a mistake to reduce all this 
science to a singular philosophical point of view or mode of practice. 
Similarly, it's impossible to generalize about all neuronovels. However, 
many of them exploit the centrality of the brain to suggest a para-
dox: when the brain is at the center, its contexts and its ambiguities 
become resoundingly visible, revealing the impossibility of reducing 
the self to mechanistic models of cellular interaction. In this sense, 
many of the novels Roth discusses engage in a more robust dialogue 
with the sciences than the one he caricatures.
Neuronovels ask us to take biology seriously, to include cells, 
genes, and organs in our estimation of selfhood, but not necessarily 
to oversimplify biology's role. When neuronovels ask how biology, 
self, and culture impinge on each other, they challenge readers to 
understand neurological difference such as Tourette's Syndrome in 
Lethem's Motherless Brooklyn or autism in Mark Haddon's The Curious 
Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time. The enterprise is not without 
hazards. Lethem's and Haddon's novels risk dealing in caricatures of 
neurological difference, reinforcing stereotypes, or making readers 
feel they are gaining genuine knowledge from fictional portraits. Even 
when this is the case, those same novels provoke reconsideration of 
assumptions about the relation between brain and self, often through 
their emphasis on material interiority, or the portrait of conscious-
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ness as dynamic and relational. Similarly, it's possible to argue (as 
Roth does) that where Woolf emphasizes the subjective experience 
of consciousness, McEwan reduces consciousness to brain activity or 
diseases.6 But that would be to miss the irony implicit in his dramati-
zation of his protagonist's fantasy of finding the selves of his patients 
when he cuts open their brains. Like Clarissa Dalloway, Henry Perowne 
is bourgeois, privileged, and myopic. But also like Woolf's character, 
Perowne (as his narrator calls him) gives readers plenty of cues to see 
his failings and to sympathize with his epistemological limitations. In a 
different vein, Wray's Lowboy is a social and political novel, a critique 
on established medical practices for treating mental illness and an 
exploration of the ways that race and class shape identity. Hustvedt 
adopts a more philosophical—almost theoretical—stance, dramatiz-
ing the impossible overdetermination of identity, whose contours are 
shaped by social relations, memory, physiology, sensory experience, 
emotion, and history. In each case, the writer "assimilates" science so 
as to "expand the writ of literature" to examine new inflections of the 
subject Roth argues they eschew: "the personal, the self." Like their 
modernist predecessors, neuronovels are experiments in narrative 
representation, experiments that challenge longstanding assumptions 
about subjectivity and interiority. They exploit twenty-first-century 
forms of material interiority to give readers an expanded view of "the 
feeling of what happens." 
The Explanatory Gap
It's significant that Erik Davidsen is wrong about Dum's brain. 
He's confounded by material interiority. "When the man was alive," 
he reports, "it was all there—internal pictures and words, memories 
of the dead and the living" (5). That "once-living man" was never 
found in the brain Erik holds. To use Cohen's terms, his words and 
memories were "ethereal," his body "tangible." But his body didn't 
simply house his mind. The resolution of Erik's crisis—a midlife 
depression exacerbated by self-imposed isolation—requires a philo-
sophical reorientation. Selfhood, he comes to learn, emerges from a 
dynamic interaction of brain, body, and world. Erik must learn that 
he, like Dum, is more than the sum of his brain cells. In short, he 
must return to the messy world of the social by getting involved in 
the novel's two-pronged mystery plot, which involves questions about 
a trauma in his father's childhood and the blackmail of his sister by 
a former lover of her dead husband. The memory, regret, and desire 
that animate this plot feel ineffable, but they are dependent on the 
bodies and relationships of those involved. Hence Erik's reluctance.
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Erik is stuck in the gap between the material and the immate-
rial, along with the protagonists of Lowboy and Saturday. In Lowboy, 
Will hides on a New York City subway platform, reflecting on the 
bewildering interplay of environmental stimulus, the current of his 
thoughts, and the physiology of his brain: 
Lowboy listened to the sound of the wheels, to the squealing 
of the housings at the railheads and the bends, to the train's 
manifold and particulate elements functioning effortlessly 
in concert. Welcoming, familiar, almost sentimental sounds. 
His thoughts fell slackly into place. Even his cramped and 
claustrophobic brain felt a measure of affection for the tun-
nel. It was his skull that held him captive, after all, not the 
tunnel or the passengers on the train. I'm a prisoner of my 
own brainpan, he thought. Hostage of my limbic system. 
There's no way out for me but through my nose. (5)
Throughout the novel, Will's conviction about the origin of his self-
hood vacillates. Sometimes he's sure it's his brain, at other times, 
the "particulate elements" of his world. But neither answer is suf-
ficient. Wray makes it clear that to find Will, readers should look to 
the dense and elusive interplay of brain, body, and world. During 
surgery, McEwan's Perowne does exactly that, probing brains more 
literally and thoroughly than the characters in the other two novels: 
"For all the recent advances," he reports during surgery, "it's still not 
known how this well-protected one kilogram or so of cells actually 
encodes information, how it holds experiences, memories, dreams 
and intentions. He doesn't doubt that in years to come, the coding 
mechanism will be known" (262). 
As with Erik and Will, Perowne is wrong about his conviction 
that neuroscience is all we need to understand selfhood. His certainty 
is shaken through his encounter with Baxter and is mitigated by his 
fascination with nonverbal meaning in music and his evolving attitudes 
about poetry as a means of engaging the ineffable. Like Clarissa Dal-
loway's, Henry's insights are both genuine and flawed. Throughout 
the narrative, he clings to the idea that physiology can explain self-
hood, but the narrative's central conflict is resolved through a poem 
and a surgery whose musical accompaniment is central to its suc-
cess. While Henry shares the fantasy of class privilege that defines 
Clarissa's subjective limitations, his beliefs are equally shaped by his 
conviction that the brain is the key to all mythologies. Woolf is more 
subtle than McEwan, refusing to represent Clarissa's experience as 
transformative. When her worldview is challenged, she is confused; 
when Henry's is challenged, he budges. McEwan's portrait of the 
self, written in the age of neural plasticity, may suggest a too-easy 
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transformation even while McEwan questions his protagonist's overly 
rigid ideas about cause and effect relationships between physiology 
and experience. 
Contradiction and inconsistency are inevitable when a novelist 
explores relations between physiology and self; in fact, they may 
be the point. In neuronovels, the gap between the material and the 
immaterial complicates the representation of mental experience. 
For example, Will's fantasy of extracting his brain—and therefore 
himself—through his nasal passages neatly summarizes a central 
problem of these texts. He's looking for his ineffable, suffering self in 
the contact between two forms of matter: his brain and the subway 
tunnels. This impossible quest echoes the epistemological impossi-
bilities inherent in an emerging doctrine in theoretical neuroscience 
and cognitive philosophy: the idea that consciousness and self are 
products of the dynamic interactivity between brain, body, and world. 
In Damasio's words, "Consciousness, as we commonly think of it, 
from its basic levels to its most complex, is the unified mental pat-
tern that brings together the object and the self" (11). Philosopher 
Alva Noë articulates a similar idea more assertively: "to understand 
consciousness in human and animals, we must look not inward, into 
the recesses of our insides; rather, we need to look to the ways in 
which each of us, as a whole animal, carries on the processes of liv-
ing in and with and in response to the world around us" (7). While 
the recent advances in brain research are astounding, we are far 
from understanding the vicissitudes involved when physical bodies 
in material worlds produce the ineffable experience of an organism. 
As responses to recent developments in theoretical, empirical, and 
clinical neuroscience, the ingenuity of the novels under discussion lies 
in their experimenting with narrative techniques that can submerge 
readers in the "explanatory gap" between the material and the im-
material, or the physical and the phenomenological.7
Material Interiority
In his discussion of material interiority in Charlotte Brontë's The 
Professor, Cohen asserts that the emphasis on it in Victorian fiction 
"collapses dualistic notions of mind and body":
By portraying in palpable terms the human body's enclosure 
of intangible subjectivity, [Brontë] exploits the paradox of 
an immaterial soul, heart, or mind inhabiting the flesh. 
Pervaded by metaphors of entombment and boundary 
violation, the novel's language exaggerates and estranges 
the conditions of embodiment. In using the term "material 
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interiority," I mean to designate this literary depiction of 
ethereal inner qualities in a language of tangible objects, 
a practice that collapses dualistic conceptions of mind and 
body (or body and soul) by making subjective inwardness 
and bodily innards stand for each other. (476)
Cohen's argument that Victorian fiction "exaggerates and estranges 
the conditions of embodiment" is applicable to contemporary neu-
ronovels, which also make "subjective inwardness and bodily innards 
stand for each other." Like the Victorian texts Cohen examines, neu-
ronovels remind readers that "the body is the inescapable condition 
of possibility for human existence" (Embodied 131). However, neu-
ronovels are less interested in "collapsing" dualism than they are in 
estranging relations between body and self in order to emphasize the 
"possibility" in Cohen's sentence—or, put another way, to highlight 
the epistemological and experiential uncertainties that emerge from 
the explanatory gap.
In Saturday, for example, Perowne touches brains for a liv-
ing. In place of Clarissa Dalloway's flights into other characters' 
psyches, Perowne penetrates other characters' skulls. The novel 
features numerous surgery scenes, during which Perowne expertly 
cuts open people's skulls and cuts into their brain matter in the hope 
of changing or saving their lives. McEwan depicts these surgeries in 
exquisite detail. When he does so, his narrator assumes a double 
position, emphasizing Perowne's surgical techniques and speculat-
ing on philosophical questions about the capacity of the brain mat-
ter to animate his patients. The novel's primary conflict is resolved 
through a five-page surgery scene. Henry performs this surgery on a 
character named Baxter, a thug whose portrayal resembles Dickens 
more than Woolf:
Now, using the same dissector, he lifts the whole free flap 
away from the skull, a large piece of bone like a segment 
of coconut, and lays it in the bowl with the other bits. The 
clot is in full view, red of such darkness it is almost black, 
and of the consistency of recently set jam. Or, as Perowne 
sometimes thinks, like a placenta. But round the edges of 
the clot, blood is flowing freely now that the pressure of the 
bone flap has been relieved. It pours off the back of Baxter's 
head, over the surgical drapes and onto the floor. (260)
Perowne's observations are thick with metaphors that estrange the 
patient's brain, even for a neurosurgeon intimate with the anatomy. 
The skull is a "coconut," the clot "set jam." His placenta analogy sug-
gests an unrepresented history for Baxter. Before he was a man in 
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middle age, like Perowne, Baxter was a fetus, then an infant, a child, 
an adolescent, and a young man. Now his vulnerable body "pours" 
out of him. Perowne's job is to inflict bodily trauma in order to heal, 
violating his body's boundaries in order to restore them. 
Henry's colleagues don't know it, but Henry caused Baxter's 
injury by pushing him down a flight of stairs after Baxter broke into 
his house, terrorized his family, and threatened to rape his daughter. 
Henry keeps another secret from his colleagues. In addition to the 
blood clot, Baxter suffers from fairly advanced Huntington's Disease. 
His life, however compromised, depends on the success of the sur-
gery, depicted in clinical detail: 
"Elevate the head of the table. Give me as much as you 
can," Henry calls to Jay. If the bleed is higher than the 
heart, the blood will flow less copiously. The table rises, 
and Henry and Rodney step back in quickly through the 
blood at their feet and, working together, use a sucker and 
an Adson elevator to remove the clot. . . . But they can't 
close up yet. Perowne takes a scalpel and makes a small 
incision in the dura, parts it a little and peers inside. The 
surface of Baxter's brain is indeed covered with a clot, much 
smaller than the first. He extends the incision and Rodney 
tucks back the dura with stay sutures. (260)
The scene may be contemporary literature's most elaborate (and 
meticulously researched) display of material interiority. The brain 
anatomy with which Perowne is so familiar is estranged because of 
his charged and overdetermined relationship with Baxter, setting the 
stage for the surgeon to fantasize about the "ethereal" aspects of 
self he might find as he dissects his antagonist's brain. In the novel's 
acknowledgments, McEwan thanks a number of neurosurgeons, in-
cluding Neil Kitchen: "It was a privilege to watch this gifted surgeon 
at work in the theatre over a period of two years" (292). McEwan's 
research shows in these passages. Their length and detail feel like 
they're coming from a writer who can't resist demonstrating what he's 
learned. However, the language of the passage is literary, not clinical. 
Metaphors are not uncommon in medical literature, but the emphasis 
on emotionally charged sensory experience—"[blood] pours off the 
back of Baxter's head, over the surgical drapes and onto the floor"—is 
where the craft of the novelist transforms the clinical into the literary. 
Baxter's body is commingling with the antiseptic environment of the 
operating room. Readers are asked to indulge the fantasy that an 
exchange of Baxter's immaterial self is taking place when Perowne 
cuts him open and lets the contents of his body pour "freely" into the 
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room. Even Perowne, thoroughly a materialist, imagines that he'll 
learn something about the mind by touching the brain. 
As the scene proceeds, philosophical reflections intrude on the 
clinical. Like Damasio, Perowne finds all the evidence he needs to 
revere life in the brain as a physical organ. But his materialism seems 
to soften as the scene progresses and it becomes clear that Perowne 
is looking for more than a blood clot under Baxter's skull:
For all the recent advances, it's still not known how this 
well-protected one kilogram or so of cells actually encodes 
information, how it holds experiences, memories, dreams 
and intentions. He doesn't doubt that in years to come, the 
coding mechanism will be known, though it might not be 
in his lifetime. . . . But even when it has, the wonder will 
remain, that mere wet stuff can make this bright inward 
cinema of thought, of sight and sound and touch bound 
into a vivid illusion of an instantaneous present, with a self, 
another brightly wrought illusion, hovering like a ghost at 
its centre. Could it ever be explained, how matter becomes 
conscious? (262)
Perowne sounds almost like an Enlightenment naturalist when it 
comes to predicting epistemological revolutions just beyond reach—
a gesture common among neuroscience enthusiasts. You could 
call these predictions rhetorical sleights of hand, whereby what we 
might know in the future stands in for what we don't know now, but 
you might also call them fantasy. It's debatable whether we'll ever 
understand the complex relationship between matter (our brains, 
our bodies, and the physical world around us) and the immaterial or 
ineffable experience of self or consciousness. In the meantime, novel-
ists offer aesthetic experience in place of epistemological certainty. 
Whereas science deals in hypothesis, literature deals in the 
creation of speculative worlds. Both enterprises demonstrate the 
value of counterfactual thinking—imagining what we cannot yet 
know. Touching brains to find minds is a fantastical enterprise. In 
literature, the irony of a quest is explicit. Neuronovelists dramatize 
epistemological questions that confound science and philosophy, but 
they make no claim to resolve them. In the process, it becomes clear 
that moments of material interiority mirror a generalizable formal 
principle: aesthetic experience involves the inexplicable traffic be-
tween the material and the immaterial in ways that feel automatic and 
often go unnoticed. Words on a page, images on a screen, or sound 
vibrating from a speaker act on the bodies of readers, spectators, 
and listeners and in the process trigger a spectrum of immaterial 
experiences—affective responses, acts of inspiration or imagination, 
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emotions, desire, and memory—whose physiological correlates, felt 
and unfelt, trigger still more immaterial experiences, and so on. In 
this sense, a form of material interiority is fundamental to the ca-
pacity for the aesthetic "transmission of affect," to borrow a phrase 
from the title of feminist philosopher Teresa Brennan's book about 
the human capacity to share felt states. In the final section of this 
essay, I will argue that while Hustvedt, McEwan, and Wray begin by 
probing the origins of ineffable experience, they conclude by focusing 
on the means for transmitting or sharing it.
Baxter's Blood, Will's Membrane, and Burton's Sweat 
In the conclusion to Embodied, Cohen revisits "fractured mo-
ments that provide glimpses of the body unmaking any abstract 
idea of the human" in Victorian literature (129). He argues that such 
moments highlight "the contiguous and reciprocal contact between 
body and world by focusing on sensory influx and corporeal outflow." 
In his words, 
they draw attention to the conditions of embodiment itself. 
When the body obtrudes on the self and cannot be regarded 
merely as its container, we are shocked into recognition of 
the fullness of bodily existence. Such a recognition registers 
the primacy of the material that is the human and, at the 
same time, prevents that material from becoming fixed 
and left behind by an idea of the ethereal, transcendent, 
or universal personhood. (131)
Scenes of "sensory influx and corporeal outflow" are central in the 
neuronovels I've been discussing. Cohen emphasizes obtrusions of 
the body on the self. These neuronovels extend that idea: as their 
narratives proceed toward resolution, they emphasize moments when 
characters' bodies "obtrude" on each other, catalyzing moments of 
shared subjectivity whereby characters feel like they bridge the gap 
between one "ethereal" consciousness and another, however momen-
tary or fleeting the experience. Ultimately, plot resolutions depend 
on these moments of shared subjectivity, similar to the ones Woolf 
depicts, with the crucial difference that they arise from moments 
of contact between bodily organs or fluids, sometimes literally and 
sometimes metaphorically. In the process of solving the crimes that 
drive their plots, a great deal of bodily obtrusion enables characters 
to overcome the isolation of "the private, first-person phenomenon" 
of consciousness, to borrow a phrase from Damasio (12). 
In Lowboy, for example, Will spends much of the novel on a 
quest to lose his virginity. His first attempt, in the makeshift subway 
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tunnel home of a woman named Heather Covington, fails. Nonethe-
less, Will's reflections on the experience demonstrate his desire for 
psychological release through bodily obtrusion:
She closed her eyes and opened her legs wider. He looked 
away for the length of a breath, then leaned forward until 
he could feel the warmth of her bare skin against his face. 
The smell forced his mouth and eyes shut. He thought 
about the inside of his body: how cold and shutaway it was, 
like a doll forgotten in an empty house. He thought about 
the end of the world, about the people above the grates, 
about the tunnel, about MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY. 
The dinosaurs set like urns into the wall. He pictured his 
own skeleton there, then Heather Covington's, then Vio-
let's. What he needed to do was as clear as if it had been 
burned into him with electric wire. He needed to break the 
membrane that had held him all his life, to slip out into the 
putrefying world. He had to put himself into another body. 
He had to bite down on his tongue and push.
 Above the grate someone was laughing softly. 
 "I can't do it," he gasped, gagging on his own breath. 
"It's gone to sleep, Miss Covington. Take a look." (68)
Toward the end of the novel, Will does lose his virginity with a pros-
titute who calls herself Secretary. The scene enables him, finally, to 
feel like he's broken "the membrane that had held him all his life": 
The room had gone silent and the light had gone dim and 
he opened his mouth and the whole world went silent. 
Somewhere voices were screaming in amazement and 
victory but the screaming was too far off for him to hear. 
There was no need to hear. She was moving above him. He 
could see out of the holes in her eyes and taste with her 
mouth and feel every single thing that she was feeling. He 
felt the skin around him breaking and the silence breaking 
with it. He seeped out of his body like the yolk out of an 
egg. The world was outside his body now, which meant he 
was alone. His body was on the outside of the world. (221)
Like Erik and Perowne, Will is an unreliable narrator. His delusions 
may account for his belief that he can "feel every single thing that she 
was feeling." But the moment, followed by a beating in which Will's 
body is obtruded in another more painful and violent way, motivates 
him to return to the Union Square subway stop, the scene of the 
Touching Brains350
crime that led to his incarceration—a place where Lateef and Violet 
are likely to find him. Lateef apprehends him momentarily. He bites 
the detective's cheek, tasting his blood as he falls onto the tracks. 
Will is relentless in his quest for connection through bodily obtrusion. 
Will's feeling of shared subjectivity is grand and generalized. 
When he dies, the delusional narrator tells us, "the world ended by 
fire" (258). While his case is extreme, it's contiguous with moments 
in other neuronovels, including the empathy McEwan's Perowne feels 
for Baxter. Before giving his assent to close, Perowne directs a nurse 
to put on Barber's "Adagio for Strings"—to replace the Bach that 
played during surgery. Music is the only form of art that seems not to 
leave Perowne cold, and he chooses the soundtracks to his surgeries 
carefully. Barber becomes the vehicle for Perowne's empathy:
When at last the head bandage is in place and secured, 
everyone in the theatre, the whole firm, converges on 
Baxter—this is the stage at which the patient's identity 
is restored, when a small area of violently revealed brain 
is returned to the possession of the entire person. This 
unwrapping of the patient marks a return to life, and if he 
hadn't seen it many hundred times before, Henry feels he 
could almost mistake it for tenderness. While Emily and 
Joan are carefully pulling away the surgical drapes from 
around Baxter's chest and legs, Rodney makes sure the 
tubes, leads and drains are not dislodged. Gita is removing 
the pads taped over the patient's eyes. Jay is detaching 
the inflatable warming blanket from around Baxter's legs. 
Henry stands at the edge of the table, cradling the head in 
his hands. The helpless body is revealed in a hospital gown 
and looks small on the table. The meditative line of orches-
tral strings seems to be addressed to Baxter alone. (264)
On completion of the surgery, Perowne reflects on "the dream of 
absorption" or "benevolent disassociation" that transports him when 
he cuts people open and repairs their damaged flesh. "He's been de-
livered to a pure present," he thinks. "It's a little like sex, in that he 
feels himself in another medium. . . . It's a feeling of clarified empti-
ness, of deep, muted joy" (266). This particular case is more charged 
than most. Baxter, the man whose blood poured all over him during 
surgery, is his partner in this "pure present." He's become intimate 
with the physiology of his persecutor, the man who nearly raped his 
daughter. When Perowne expresses the feeling that the music "seems 
to be addressed to Baxter alone," he adopts Baxter's perspective—or 
his fantasy of it, momentarily bridging the divide between himself 
and this man who is so different from him in all worldly particulars. If 
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Will is unreliable because of his delusions, Perowne, "the professional 
reductionist" (281), is unreliable because of his rigid materialism, 
whose persistence is indicated by the scene's final sentence: "There 
must, he concludes as he stands to leave the theatre, be something 
wrong with him" (266). After risking his career by insisting on operat-
ing on a man whose injuries he causes, Perowne is unable to main-
tain reflection on his own motives or feelings. While he may dismiss 
his actions, it's clear to readers that he's been seeking empathy for 
his persecutor because he needs it to resolve the psychological and 
epistemological confusion their conflict exposed. 
Genital contact is the vehicle for Will's feeling of shared subjec-
tivity; for Perowne, it's Baxter's blood and brain. For Erik, Husvedt's 
psychiatrist narrator, it's his friend Burton's sweat. In middle age, 
when readers meet him, Erik is a serious man who's unlikely to give 
a nickname to a cadaver. When he thinks about holding Dum's brain 
in his hands, readers become privy to a history that haunts him. 
Erik was once a younger man, a medical student willing and able to 
participate in a little gallows humor. As he thinks about the "internal 
pictures and words" of the "once-living man" represented by that 
three pounds of flesh (5), readers are prompted to think about Erik 
in these terms. His "memories of the dead and the living" are internal 
pictures and words, as Dum's once were. If Erik were right that a life 
like Dum's could be found in the brain alone, there would be no crisis 
to resolve—simply a crime to be prosecuted. But life, Hustvedt's novel 
suggests, happens in the breach between materiality and conscious-
ness. The power of the brain requires a context: a body in a world of 
other bodies and multitudes of organisms and objects that play roles 
in the emergence of a human life from systems of proteins, amino 
acids, chemicals, cells, and organs. Through self-imposed isolation, 
Erik has been avoiding the contexts that might change his life.
That's where his sweaty friend Burton comes in. Burton is a 
minor character with a noxious case of material interiority—hyper-
hidrosis—and a central role in the novel's resolution: 
Burton was a fat, waddling, red-faced person who had little 
luck with girls. His chief trouble, however, wasn't his looks, 
but his moistness. Even in winter, Burton had a steamy 
appearance. Bubbles of perspiration protruded from his 
upper lip. His forehead gleamed, and his dark shirts were 
notable for the great damp circles under his arms. The poor 
fellow gave the impression that he was humid to the core, 
a peripatetic swamp of a man with a single vital accoutre-
ment—his handkerchief. Once in medical school I had sug-
gested that there were some treatments for hyperhidrosis. 
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Burton had informed me that he had tried everything known 
to humankind that didn't risk turning him into a vegetable, 
and his was a hopeless case. "My ur-reality is sweat," he 
told me. The first year of residency had marked the end of 
his career as a practicing physician. His melancholy, drip-
ping face, his sticky palms and sodden handkerchief had 
alienated nearly every conscious patient. . . . (67)
Burton is a messy counterpoint to a protagonist who doesn't realize 
how much he needs his help. Perhaps unsurprisingly, his sweat has 
everything to do with his brain and his mind. People with generalized 
hyperhidrosis like Burton's sweat profusely all over their bodies. While 
the cause of hyperhidrosis is the subject of some debate, the nervous 
system plays a role. Of course, many people sweat more when they're 
anxious, but people like Burton sweat a lot more. At the end of the 
novel, Burton's sweat abates somewhat after the death of his mother. 
He confesses his concern to Erik that the change—and therefore the 
sweat itself—might be "symptomatic" (233). A psychoanalyst might 
see Burton's sweat as a symptom of his feelings about his mother 
or a childhood trauma. Nonsense, a physician might say. Burton's 
problem is physical. Hustvedt is careful not to resolve the impasse. 
In the words of Erik: "I wouldn't overinterpret what appears to be a 
good thing" (233). 
Burton's sweat represents the murkiness of relations between 
psychological and physical experience, a visible sign of inarticulate 
and largely unknowable corporeal experience, what Damasio has 
sometimes called the body's "wordless storytelling" (188). One of 
Burton's roles is to pull some murk out of the novel's other charac-
ters, who speak so deftly that their bodies, unlike Burton's, don't get 
much chance to communicate. In contrast to Burton, Erik is about as 
dry as a person gets. He's also the narrator of a novel populated by 
characters whose ur-realities are ideas and who aren't themselves 
any closer to resolving the emotional conflicts or family mysteries 
that hamper them. They are frustrated, unhappy creatures search-
ing for elusive meanings about their pasts, their deceased relatives, 
their spouses, their crushes, and their work. Ideas insulate them. 
Burton sweats all over these ideas, dons a wig, solves the novel's 
central mystery, and delivers some moist comfort to his dry friends.
Burton belongs to a tradition of literary characters who se-
crete too much, from the pissing giants in Rabelais's Gargantua and 
Pantagruel (1532–64) to the farting Ignatius J. Reilly in John Ken-
nedy O'Toole's The Confederacy of Dunces (1980). Their secretions 
are palpable transmitters of affect. Of course, the root of the word 
"secretion" is "secret," meaning something set apart or concealed 
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as private. You might say these characters are leaking for the rest 
of us, whose secretions are taboo. Even though the experiences are 
unquestionably universal, we're not supposed to sweat, fart, puke, 
piss, bleed, or ejaculate in public. Keep your secretions to yourself, 
the taboo reminds us. That taboo is violated by the characters in 
Lowboy, Saturday, and Sorrows of an American—and, in another 
sense, by their authors. Like Rabelais and O'Toole, they printed and 
published accounts of their characters' leaking bodies. Their novels 
are public declarations that the taboo against public obtrusions of 
bodily boundaries may inhibit something integral to life—the material 
interiority that animates human beings and undergirds social con-
nection. The protagonists of all three novels are seeking emotional 
and psychological connection through bodily contact. 
Hustvedt's earlier novel, What I Loved, gives a name to what 
they seek. In that novel, Hustvedt's character Violet proposes a 
theory of "mixing" in a book she's writing about anorexia: "They 
find a way to separate the needs and desires of other people from 
their own. After a while, they rebel by shutting down. They want to 
close up all their openings so nothing and nobody can get in. But 
mixing is the way of the world. The world passes through us—food, 
books, pictures, other people" (88). Anorexia, Violet theorizes, is an 
attempt to prevent mixing. In that sense, not mixing is pathologi-
cal. Plot resolution in Lowboy, Saturday, and Sorrows for an Ameri-
can requires characters to reconceive their relationship to "all their 
openings." The world, including elements of other people's bodies, 
passes through us—mostly in undetectable ways. In Cohen's words, 
"permeable and pervious to the world through our senses, our bodies 
are . . . dynamic selves" (Embodied 132). The characters I've been 
discussing experience their own failures to mix with other people as 
a confounding obstruction; it inhibits their "dynamic selves" and their 
relationships. The narratives in which they star are propelled by their 
desires to find ways to mix through sex, surgery, physical violence, 
endurance of another's sweat, or engagement with other people's 
life stories (as in psychotherapy or detective work).
In many ways, neuronovels focus on material interiority a as 
way of addressing E. M. Forster's famous dictum from Howard's 
End: "Only connect" (202). Touching another person's brain to find 
that person's self is a fantasy of connecting: finding empathy, shar-
ing feelings, exchanging affect, and blending each other's stories. 
Recently, science has developed new methods to explore facets of 
human connection and exchange. Studies on mirror neurons and 
empathy are widespread in neuroscience. Studies on neuroaesthet-
ics and the ways literary language affects readers are increasingly 
common. Research on emotional contagion enjoys a high profile in 
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social psychology.8 Only connect, Forster wrote. This is how we do 
it, the studies suggest. If only I could, these characters might reply. 
Understanding the physiology and psychology of connection would 
not satisfy Forster, and it won't help the suffering protagonists of 
these novels. Will's psychiatric treatment doesn't help; in fact, his 
medication inhibits connection. Nor does Perowne's strict materialism 
or Erik's psychiatric training and practice facilitate interaction. But 
each of them encounters characters who provoke them to mix. For 
Eric, It's Burton; for Will, it's Heather Covington and Secretary; and 
for Perowne, it's Baxter. Their leaking counterparts help them fulfill 
Forster's dictum or Violet's axiom. These characters are reminders 
that we're all leaking substances that reveal aspects of self we're 
hardly aware of. The leakage is essential for the mixing. 
At the end of Embodied, Cohen quotes The Picture of Dorian 
Gray: "to convey one's temperament into another as though it were a 
subtle fluid or a strange perfume: there was a real joy in that" (136). 
"This is a transitivity," Cohen concludes, "beyond the boundaries of the 
self, soul, or indeed body itself, a material form of existence whose 
porousness puts it both outside and at the center of what it means to 
be human" (136). Ultimately, neuronovels explore this porousness, 
the mechanisms and meanings of which are elusive partly because 
they occupy the explanatory gap that confounds neuroscience and 
philosophy. Rather than offering theories or proposals about the re-
lationship between physiology and self, they create narratives that 
propel characters from the examination of bodies into the feeling of 
shared experience. By devising aesthetic means of representing the 
gap, they encourage readers to think about their own porousness. 
As Hustvedt's Violet points out, books are one form of material 
that "passes through us." In her book Feeling Beauty: The Neurosci-
ence of Aesthetic Experience, Gabrielle Starr proposes a theory of 
aesthetics that complements Cohen's argument about porousness, 
and that may explain how and why twenty-first century novelists 
are responding in such great numbers to the exciting discoveries 
and confounding questions of neuroscience. Drawing on a blend of 
empirical research and literary analysis, Starr concludes, "the arts 
mediate our knowledge of the world around us by directing our atten-
tion, shaping perceptions, and creating dissonance or harmony where 
none had been before" (14). In other words, art makes new experi-
ence possible because "mental images serve to integrate a variety 
of information" (78). In both cognitive and physiological terms, "im-
agery is, de facto, not just multidimensional but multisensory" (78). 
Aesthetic experience marshals the brain's interconnectivity to induce 
experiences that yield new combinations of sensory, cognitive, and 
emotional experience. As an aesthetic technique, material interiority 
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requires readers (and characters) to live with the ambiguity inherent 
in the idea that our bodies are "both outside and at the center of 
what it means to be human." To do that, novelists develop narrative 
strategies that encompass both the harmony and dissonance central 
to Starr's proposition about art's capacity to exploit the porousness 
Cohen describes. Erik can't reconstruct the man whose body Dum's 
brain once occupied, but when he feels its weight, it provokes him 
to imagine the man's experience. It becomes an aesthetic engage-
ment, like reading a novel. In their responses to the neuroscientific 
revolution, novelists play a unique role, crafting narratives that may 
forestall simplistic or reductive understandings of the relationship 
between brain and self, using the materiality of written words to shape 
the perception of readers—enabling them to feel the porousness of 
the explanatory gap. 
Notes
1. Lowboy is narrated in alternating chapters by Will and Lateef. In an 
interesting formal parallel, Patrick and Henry Cockburn's collabora-
tive memoir, Henry's Demons: Living with Schizophrenia, A Father 
and Son's Story, is narrated in alternating chapters by Patrick and 
his schizophrenic son Henry. In both texts, the alternating chapters 
have the effect of juxtaposing the first-person experience of schizo-
phrenia with the perspective of an observer, preventing the dismissal 
or stigmatization of schizophrenic subjectivity. 
2. For an account of the broader neurocultures context to which such 
novels belong, see Ortega and Vidal; and Besser, "Beyond Reduction-
ism." 
3. Of course, neuronovelists did not invent the depiction of touching or 
exploring brains (or other body parts) for signs of immaterial elements 
of self. Scenes like these have a history. Variations on them can be 
found in a variety of texts, genres, and periods including medieval 
representations of resurrection, Elizabethan drama rooted in humor 
theories, and contemporary science fiction depicting human-cyborg 
relations. See Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western 
Christianity, 200–1336; Harvey, Sensible Flesh: On Touch in Early 
Modern Culture; Sutton, "Spongy Brains and Material Memories" (on 
early modern medical and literary texts); Stiles, Popular Fiction and 
Brain Science in the Late Nineteenth Century; Dames, The Physiol-
ogy of the Novel; and Cohen, Embodied: Victorian Literature and the 
Senses. 
4. The Oxford English Dictionary documents the use of the term interior-
ity to mean "inner life" to a text published in 1701, though it doesn't 
list uses of the term to describe a literary technique until the 1960s. 
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Google Books's Ngram Viewer, which searches digitized texts dating 
to 1500, reveals marginal use of the term throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, with a rapid rise in use beginning in the 
1960s and continuing through to the present.
5. There is a great deal of scholarship on nineteenth-century medicine 
and psychology, focusing on the widespread cultural influence of 
these practices. On phrenology, see Shuttleworth; on physiognomy, 
see Hartly; on vivisection, see Straley; on evolutionary psychology, 
see Block, Jr.; on Darwin's literary influence, see Beer; on sexology, 
see Tougaw, Strange Cases, and Bland and Doan.
6. Influential reviews of Saturday, notably in Slate magazine and the 
New York Times, characterize the novel as an explicit reworking of 
Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway for a neuroscientific era. See Roiphe, Metcalf, 
Heller, and Kakatuni. In a recent public discussion with psychologist 
Paul Bloom, McEwan denied any awareness of the connection while he 
was writing the novel but conceded the possibility of an unconscious 
influence.
7. Philosopher Joseph Levine introduced "explanatory gap" in 1983 
to describe the difficulties of explaining the relationship between 
physiology and phenomenological experience. Since that time, it has 
become central to debates in consciousness studies.
8. For a sociological study of mirror neuron research, see Pitts-Taylor, 
"I Feel Your Pain: Emodied Knowledges and Situated Neurons." For 
an excellent discussion of neuroasthetics, see Starr, Feeling Beauty: 
The Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience. For a brief survey of in-
fluential research on emotional contagion, see Hatfield, Cacioppo, 
and Rapson, Emotional Contagion. 
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